| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| latest 0.x minor | yes |
| anything older | no |
Security fixes land on the latest 0.x minor release only.
Please report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub: https://github.com/kar-thik/openproject-mcp/security/advisories/new
Do not open public issues for suspected vulnerabilities. This is a solo-maintained project: you can expect a best-effort acknowledgment within a week. There is no bug bounty.
The areas most worth scrutiny in an MCP server that holds an OpenProject API key:
- Credential handling — the API key and OAuth token are held as Pydantic
SecretStrvalues;Authorization,Proxy-Authorizationand cookie headers are redacted before logging (request/response bodies are logged only whenOPENPROJECT_MCP_LOG_BODIES=1and the level is DEBUG), and theAuthorizationheader is stripped when a redirect leaves the OpenProject origin. - Attachment downloads — quarantined files are refused with a structured
error, downloads are capped by
OPENPROJECT_MCP_MAX_DOWNLOAD_MB, filenames are sanitized before any filesystem use, and a SHA-256 digest of the bytes is returned for verification. - HTTP transport — binds
127.0.0.1by default and refuses to start withoutOPENPROJECT_MCP_AUTH_TOKENSunlessOPENPROJECT_MCP_INSECURE=1is set explicitly (local development only). With tokens configured, every request must carryAuthorization: Bearer <token>matching a configured token — comparison is constant-time, anything else is rejected with a 401 — and a set-but-empty token list refuses to start rather than serving an open endpoint. The server does not terminate TLS or rate-limit the endpoint: keep the localhost bind, or front it with a TLS-terminating reverse proxy and use long random tokens. - Shared upstream identity — bearer tokens authenticate clients to the MCP endpoint, but the server holds one OpenProject credential: every HTTP client acts as that OpenProject user and shares one metadata cache scope. The server does not isolate upstream users from one another; per-user OpenProject authentication is not implemented. Run it only for clients you would trust with that account, and give it a dedicated, least-privileged user.
- Local file access —
upload_attachment,create_work_package (attachment_paths)anddownload_attachmentread and write files on the server's machine.OPENPROJECT_MCP_UPLOAD_ROOTandOPENPROJECT_MCP_DOWNLOAD_ROOTconfine them: paths are resolved, symlinks included, and must stay beneath the root, and the final open walks the path withO_NOFOLLOWso a symlink swapped in after the check cannot escape it (on platforms without descriptor-relative opens, such as Windows, only the resolved-path check applies). Over HTTP each root is required: without it the matching file tools are hidden andattachment_pathsis refused. Over stdio the roots stay optional.