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Security: kar-thik/openproject-mcp

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

Version Supported
latest 0.x minor yes
anything older no

Security fixes land on the latest 0.x minor release only.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub: https://github.com/kar-thik/openproject-mcp/security/advisories/new

Do not open public issues for suspected vulnerabilities. This is a solo-maintained project: you can expect a best-effort acknowledgment within a week. There is no bug bounty.

Scope

The areas most worth scrutiny in an MCP server that holds an OpenProject API key:

  • Credential handling — the API key and OAuth token are held as Pydantic SecretStr values; Authorization, Proxy-Authorization and cookie headers are redacted before logging (request/response bodies are logged only when OPENPROJECT_MCP_LOG_BODIES=1 and the level is DEBUG), and the Authorization header is stripped when a redirect leaves the OpenProject origin.
  • Attachment downloads — quarantined files are refused with a structured error, downloads are capped by OPENPROJECT_MCP_MAX_DOWNLOAD_MB, filenames are sanitized before any filesystem use, and a SHA-256 digest of the bytes is returned for verification.
  • HTTP transport — binds 127.0.0.1 by default and refuses to start without OPENPROJECT_MCP_AUTH_TOKENS unless OPENPROJECT_MCP_INSECURE=1 is set explicitly (local development only). With tokens configured, every request must carry Authorization: Bearer <token> matching a configured token — comparison is constant-time, anything else is rejected with a 401 — and a set-but-empty token list refuses to start rather than serving an open endpoint. The server does not terminate TLS or rate-limit the endpoint: keep the localhost bind, or front it with a TLS-terminating reverse proxy and use long random tokens.
  • Shared upstream identity — bearer tokens authenticate clients to the MCP endpoint, but the server holds one OpenProject credential: every HTTP client acts as that OpenProject user and shares one metadata cache scope. The server does not isolate upstream users from one another; per-user OpenProject authentication is not implemented. Run it only for clients you would trust with that account, and give it a dedicated, least-privileged user.
  • Local file access — upload_attachment, create_work_package (attachment_paths) and download_attachment read and write files on the server's machine. OPENPROJECT_MCP_UPLOAD_ROOT and OPENPROJECT_MCP_DOWNLOAD_ROOT confine them: paths are resolved, symlinks included, and must stay beneath the root, and the final open walks the path with O_NOFOLLOW so a symlink swapped in after the check cannot escape it (on platforms without descriptor-relative opens, such as Windows, only the resolved-path check applies). Over HTTP each root is required: without it the matching file tools are hidden and attachment_paths is refused. Over stdio the roots stay optional.

There aren't any published security advisories